According to Elliott, the Marxian model of stationary equilibrium, which he takes to be equivalent to simple commodity production (a "simple exchange economy" in which exchange value is not the object of production), involves "the absence of a capital-labor class division" [1980, p. 50]. This is in clear contradiction to Marx's actual model of a steady-state economy (simple reproduction), which has as its basis not the absence of a division between capital and labor, but the assumption that
capitalists consume the total surplus value produced [Marx, 1967, pp. 566-78; Khan, 1957, pp. 72-76] .1 This misunderstanding of a key aspect of Marx's analysis blinds Elliott to some of the more important differences between the theories of technical change and accumulation presented by Marx and Schumpeter. To put the matter briefly, Marx creates his model of stationary equilibrium (simple reproduction) by "assuming away" accumulation but not the capitalist, while Schumpeter's model of the circular flow abstracts from the existence of the entrepreneur himself. In Schumpeter's theory, "equal access to capital" through bank credit is the defining characteristic of capitalism. This contrasts sharply with Marx's notion that capitalists, by definition, have a monopoly over the means of production. Consequently, although both theorists emphasize the discontinuous nature of the capitalist dynamic, Schumpeter sees economic development and technical change as the result of the individual entrepreneur's initiative, while in Marx's view it is the structure of accumulation itself that forms the "primum mobile" of capitalist development [Sweezy, 1970, Elliott's emphasis on the concept of simple commodity production tends to distort his interpretation of the source of change in the Marxian system, apparently leading him to conclude that the mere appearance of a "capital-labor class division" explains the generation of surplus on an expanding scale [1980, p. 51 ]. Yet,. for Marx, the "take-off' tendency within capitalism has its roots not so much in the class monopoly of the means of social creativity, as in the fact that both survival and success for the individual capitalist (and the class as a whole) are dependent on the ability to accumulate in ever larger amounts.
The bulk of Elliott's article is devoted to an examination of the concept of "creative destruction" as it applies to both Schumpeter and Marx. In doing so, he lifts Schumpeter's original notion almost 1. There is no concept within the Schumpeterian system that is strictly comparable to simple commodity production. This category, however, plays an important part in Marx's construction of the labor theory of value, since it is only by means of this step that he deduces the special'character of labor in generalized commodity production (the "labor power" distinction). completely out of the context in which it was developed (the role of innovation in both competition and monopoly) and considers it from a wider philosophical viewpoint. It is true that there is some basis for this, but it is doubtful that there is a great deal of value in the very abstract and undifferentiated comparison of Marx and Schumpeter that results. Elliott's main point is that the so-called "Schumpeterian paradox," which claims that capitalism is being destroyed not by its failures but by its successes, is not very different from the general view advanced by Marx [1980, p. 46] . Or,' in other words, capitalism is creative even in its self-destruction. This is an important observation, but one that can easily be beaten into the ground.
Nor Hence, socialism is seen as relatively indeterminate in relation to Marx's theory which emphasizes not only that production would be under public control, but also (and more importantly) that the entire structure of society would come under the hegemonic domination of direct producers. Consequently, the fact that each saw "socialism" as, to some extent, the logical outcome of capitalist development and transformation appears to suggest a greater degree of convergence in outlook that can legitimately be deduced.
Schumpeter, of course, viewed the demise of the entrepreneur and the prospect of a "socialist" future as the chief tragedy of modern society. In his later years he frequently advocated a new form of corporate capitalism that could fortify itself against the menace of "authoritarian statism" [Schumpeter, 1975, p. 298] . Hence, he became a strong advocate of a "corporatism of associations" in which the conflict between businessmen would be virtually eliminated and the struggle between capital and labor significantly reduced. It was necessary to find ways of bolstering the system without falling into the socialist trap of planning by state agencies, which would strike at the very heart of capital. Schumpeter's objection to the Keynesian "solution" was that it tended to undermine capitalism in precisely this way [Smithies, 1951] .
Given this political-ideological stance, Elliott's attempt to highlight the similarities between Marx and Schumpeter seems to miss what is most essential. Certainly, Schumpeter learned a great deal from Marx, as he himself was the first to admit. It is also clear that the Schumpeterian system represents one of the great "synthetic visions" [Kessler, 1961] of modern social theory, comparable in compass to the world-views of such great social theorists as Marx, Veblen, and Weber. The vastness of such undertakings should be enough to indicate that one cannot develop a critical understanding of the relationship between Marx and Schumpeter (or between Marx and Veblen or Marx and Weber, for that matter) through an exclusive preoccupation with the points at which their theoretical frameworks overlap and correspond to each other. In the final analysis, what is most interesting, and also most enlightening, is to concentrate on the way in which the socioeconomic systems of these theorists can be seen as distinct attempts to explain the laws of motion of capitalism. As with Weber, Schumpeter's enormous contribution to social theory is most usefully looked upon as an attempt to answer, in an entirely different way, questions originally posed by Marx.
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